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losing party should not have the usual ninety days in which to appeal,"' rather
than the thirty days allowed in habeas corpus and coram nobis cases. Rules
should not become instruments of oppression which penalize an unwary
defendant for the mistakes of his attorney, especially when fundamental rights
are involved."'
With the development of coram nobis, Indiana has made commendable
progress toward an effective system for post-conviction collateral attack on
criminal proceedings. The creation of the public defender's office has enabled
indigent prisoners to obtain professional assistance, thereby facilitating con-
formity to the procedural rules. Substantively, the writ does provide a remedy
for the correction of constitutional violations. However, it might be suggested
that the ultimate effectiveness of any such remedy will depend upon the
court's regard for constitutional rights themselves.
CREDITOR GROUP LIFE INSURANCE-PROTECTING THE
INSURED AGAINST MISREPRESENTATIONS AT THE
TIME OF APPLICATION
Increasingly employed in the area of home financing, creditor group life
insurance is designed to provide security to the mortgagee beyond the mort-
gage lien in event of the borrower's death. Unlike individual term life in-
surance, the group plan involves the issuance of a master policy to the creditor
institution insuring the lives of its borrowers with the death benefit, covering
the balance of the debt, payable directly to the mortgagee. Since the mort-
gagee as policyholder assumes complete administration of the plan, the
mortgagor enjoys the resulting economies in the form of reduced rates as
well as other advantages inuring from group rather than individual coverage.1
111. Rule 2-2, Rules of the Indiana Supreme Court.
112. Johns v. State, 227 Ind. 737, 748, 89 N.E.2d 281, 285 (1949) (dissenting opinion);
Lobaugh v. State, 226 Ind. 548, 551, 82 N.E.2d 247, 248 (1948) ; Wilson v. State, 222 Ind.
63, 78, 51 N.E.2d 848, 856 (1943).
1. On creditor group life insurance generally, see GREGG, AN ANALYSIS OF GROUP LIFE
INSURANcE, at index, 261 (1950).
. . The arrangements" of creditor group insurance differ with the various types of loan
transactions and the various types of financial institutions. The particular arrangement
discussed in this note which was litigated in Broidy v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co.,
186 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1951), was designed much like a typical employer group plan. (See
note 2 infra). The Aetna Life -Insurance Company, however, occasionally has written
a creditor group plan in which no negotiation with individual debtors is involved. The
bank reports a single monthly premium based on the total outstanding balance of insured
loans on the first day of the month. Coverage of the borrower is automatic on consum-
mation of the loan, and the borrower's only knowledge of the plan comes by way of the
bank's advertising of its loan facilities. (Personal interview with' a representative of
Aetna Life Insurance Company.) See also a pamphlet, PERSONAL LOAN INSURANCE
NOTES
Highly important to the future success of this unusual form of insurance
is the approach ultimately adopted by the courts in cases arising under the
creditor group contract. In the past, individual and group insurance have
been accorded differing judicial treatment and this distinction is reflected in
the rules of decision applicable to each. Nowhere is the differentiation more
significant than in those cases where the insured, at the time of application,
has been misled as to important conditions or extent of coverage of the group
plan.
In many respects some creditor group plans resemble, at least to the
borrower-insured, the ordinary term life insurance transaction. Thus, where
the plan is one in which the insured debtor's participation is optional and
requires individual application for coverage; where the insured receives an
individual certificate evidencing participation; and where the insured bears
the total premium expense, it would seem that, in controversies arising out of
misrepresentations at the time of application, judicial reliance upon individual
life cases would be justified. However, since the insured obtains protection
by membership in the group rather than by a separate policy, and is not in-
dividually selected by the insurer, the plan is highly analogous- to 'the widely
used employer group life insurance. Consequently the creditor group con-
tract is equally amenable to judicial treatment employing precedents in the
employer group cases.
2
(Aetna Life Insurance Company, 1938). It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss
the legal aspects of such a plan.
It is interesting to note that, because of the absence of medical examinations, the
success of any group plan depends on the homogeneity of the group of insured lives. It
would seem that a group of mortgage debtors is inherently more heterogeneous than a
group of employees of one employer, as in an employer group plan. Therefore, the
danger of "adverse selection" in creditor group insurance is greater than in employer
group insurance.
Creditor group life insurance is to be distinguished from other types of insurance
used by creditors for security purposes. It differs from credit insurance, which is in-
surance against loss sustained by reason of the insolvency of lebtors owing the insured,
usually for merchandise. See CoucHa, CYCLOPEDIA oF INSURANcE LAW § 1191 (1929).
And it is not the same as ordinary life insurance naming the creditor as the beneficiary,
although such ordinary life policies are issued today pro forma through the facilities of
financial institutions and without medical examinations.
2. Group life insurance is defined as a distinctive plan for insuring groups of per-
sons without individual selection of their lives. GREGG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 25. Its
most extensive use has been in employee benefit programs, where it is called employer
group insurance. In a typical employer group plan, a master policy is issued to an em-
ployer covering all or most of his employees with provisions for death and disability
benefits. The employees hold individual certificates evidencing participation in the pro-
gram. Usually coverage ceases at termination of employment. Today, the plans are
usually "contributory," i.e., the employer and employee share the premium expense. The
employer administers the plan, enlisting new participants, submitting proofs of loss, and
keeping records of those covered and the -extent of coverage. Because of this economy
in administrative expense and the elimination of medical examinations, the group insurer
provides security for the wage earner at rates below those for ordinary life insurance.
Generally, see GREGG, AN ANALYSIS OF GRoup LIFE INsuRANcE (1951); STRONG,
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IN OPERATION 125-149 (1951) ; Hanft, Group Life Insurance:
Its Legal Aspects, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 70 (1935) ; Notes, Some Economic and Le-
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In litigation involving individual insurance contracts where the insured
has relied upon the unauthorized misrepresentations of the insurer's agent,
the rule is well established that the claimant's recovery is not necessarily
precluded by a failure to note that the contents of the policy differ from the
representations of the agent 'or that the agent's authority is limited. In so
holding, the courts emphasize that it is the representation made at the "time
the policy is taken out" that are most likely to be relied upon. Realistically
it is noted that the insured, in all probability, never actually reads the terms
of the policy. Thus, in the absence of notice of limitation on the agent's
authority actually brought home to the applicant, the insurer will be bound-by
the agent's waivers and interpretation of the terms of coverage set out in the
policy.3
This broad protection afforded in the individual term life cases has not
been extended to the insured in litigation involving employer group contracts.
A majority of the courts have held the claimant bound by the written provi-
sions of the master policy despite contrary representations by the employer
at the time of application.4 The contention that the employer is the agent of
the insurer for purposes of administration of the plan is rejected.
The reasoning supporting this result is premised on traditional contract
and agency concepts. Thus, the contract of insurance, the master policy,
"runs" between the employer and insurer for the benefit of third persons-the
employee.5 Since the employer is an adverse party to the contract, receives no
commission for insurance solicited, and is not controlled by the insurer, his
position cannot be that of an agent.6 Indeed the contrary is said to be true,
gal Aspects of Group Insurance Policies, 36 COL. L. REv. 89 (1936) ; Group Insurance:
Some Legal Problems, 26 VA. L. REv. 487 (1940). Regarding employee benefit programs
in Indiana, see NYHART. RETIREMENT PLANS IN INDIANA (Indiana State Chamber of Com-
merce) (1948) ; BORDNER, THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF INDUSTRIAL PENSION
PLANS (unpublished thesis in Indiana University School of Business Library, 1948).
3. Bible v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N.Y. 458, 176 N.E. 838 (1931);
Lewitt v. Jewelers' Safety Fund Soc., 249 N.Y. 217, 164 N.E. 29 (1928); Davern v.
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 241 N.Y. 318, 150 N.E. 129 (1925); Northeastern
Shares Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 240 App. Div. 80, 269 N.Y. Supp. 351 (1st Dept.
1934) ; Paskie & Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 223 App. Div. 603, 229 N.Y. Supp.
121 (1st Dept. 1928). For an excellent discussion see Note, Power of Unautlorized
Agents to Make Binding Modifications of Insurance Policies, 62 HARV. L. Rv. 87 (1948).
4. Pool v. Protective L. Ins. Co., 26 Ala. App. 161, 155 So. 631 (1934) ; Equitable
L. Assur. Soc. v. Hall, 253 Ky. 450, 69 S.W.2d 977 (1934) ; Rogers v. Metropolitan L.
Ins. Co., 265 Mich. 202, 251 N.W. 312 (1933). Cf. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Dor-
man, 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1939) ; Equitable L. Assur. Soc. v. Florence, 47 Ga. App.
711, 171 S.E. 317 (1933) ; Leach v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 124 Kans. 584, 261 Pac. 603
(1927).
5. Kingsland v. Missouri State L. Ins. Co., 228 Mo. App. 198, 202, 66 S.W.2d 959,
961 (1933).
6. Duval v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 N.H. 543, 136 Ati. 400 (1927). See also
BROOKE, SOME PHASES OF GROUP LIFE INSURANCE LAW, PROCEEDINGS .OF THE AMsERICAN
LIFE CONVENTION, LEGAL SECTION 37 (1948) and cases cited; Cox, LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS,
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER GROUP INSURANCE CONTRACTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NOTES
and if the parties must be aligned, the policyholder is more nearly an agent
of the employee for purposes of obtaining insurance.
Once the agency relationship is denied and the employee is relegated to
the status of a third party beneficiary, the familiar rule to the effect that he
must accept the contract as made precludes recovery except upon the express
terms of the master policy.7 Illustrative of this analysis is Equitable Life In-
surance Company v. Hall,8 involving an employer group policy with perma-
nent disability benefits for employees disabled prior to the age of sixty. The
plaintiff admittedly was over the age of sixty at the time of application for
coverage; a fact known to the employer. In the action for disability benefits,
the employee contended that because of the employer's decision to accept the
plaintiff's participation in the plan, the insurer was bound by the employer's
action. In denying recovery the court refused to hold the employer to be an
agent of the insurer. Moreover, the employee was a third party beneficiary
to the contract and having accepted it for his benefit he was bound by its
terms. Thus, the approach provides a theoretical barrier whereby the insurer
can never be liable contrary to the terms of the master policy. Such analysis
is favorable to the insurance company for it renders the dispute a matter of
law for the judge, whereby the insurer avoids the "juridical risk" of an ad-
verse jury determination of disputed questions of fact; an almost fatal risk
in insurance litigation.9
Faced with the potential inequities of this situation, several courts have
endeavored to avoid the rigors of the third party beneficiary analysis by
familiar judicial techniques.
One method, adopted in a few cases, has been an express rejection "of the
view that the employer is not the insurer's agent. Typical of these cases is
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Florence.10 There a controversy arose as
AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION, LEGAL SECTIo N, 134 (1932) and cases cited. The same
reasoning is used in deciding disputes arising out of all other phases of the "life-cycle" of
the employer group plan: when the employer knows of the death or disability of the
employee, that knowledge cannot be substituted for proof of loss to the insurer. See
Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Quilty, 92 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Wing v. John Hancock
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 314 Mass. 269, 49 N.E.2d 905 (1943) ; Dewease v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
208 N.C. 732, 182 S.E. 447 (1935); Ammons v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc., 205 N.C. 23,
169 S.E. 807 (1933). Cf. Bahas v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc., 128 Pa. Super. 167, 193 Atl.
344 (1937), aff'd 331 Pa. 164, 200 Atl. 91 (1938) (The policyholder was an employee's
association, not an employer). Also, when the employer fails to remit premiums to the
insurer, the coverage of the employee has been held to have lapsed. See Mariotti v.
Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 122 N.J.L. 360, 5 A.2d 759 (1939) ; Degnan v. Metropolitan L.
Ins. Co., 178 Misc. 312, 34 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; accord, Best v. Equitable L.
Assur. Soc., 165 Pa. Super. 452, 68 A.2d 400 (1949) ; Peyton v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc.,
159 Pa. Super. 318, 48 A.2d 145 (1946).
7. See notes 5 and 6 mtpra.
8. 253 Ky. 450, 69 S.W.2d 977 (1934).
9. "A juridical risk is ...a chance that the insurer will have to pay something that
he does not owe, because of erroneous or prejudiced determinations of fact in litigation."
PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF IiSURANCE LAw 280 (1935).
10. 47 Ga. App. 711, 171 S.E. 317 (1933). See, John. Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v.
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to whether the insured was an employee of the Standard Oil Company so as
to be covered under Standard's group policy. The court stated that even if
the insured were not an employee within the terms of the master policy,
Standard Oil had actual knowledge of this fact. This knowledge was im-
putable to the insurer as the employer was the agent of the insurer in sub-
mitting the application and having the policy issued.
In finding this agency relationship, the courts have emphasized that all
of the insurer's contacts with the employee are through the employer; the
lack of any knowledge, or any means of obtaining knowledge, by the employee
of the relationship between the insurer and employer; the fact that the em-
ployee was instructed to make payment of premiums, to submit proof of loss,
etc., to his employer rather than directly to the insurer; and, generally, that
the employee had done all that he could reasonably be expected to do in his
dealings with the employer." Also, the payment of a commission to the em-
ployer for -conducting the operation of the plan was sufficient to make him
the agent of the insurer.12
The doctrine of equitable estoppel also has occasionally been utilized to
hold the insurer contrary to the terms of the master policy, even by courts
that follow the third party beneficiary theory. .Thus, in John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Dorman2 the insurer was estopped from as-
serting that the status of the insured was not that of an employee. The
employer knew of the connection of the insured with the company and ac-
cepted the insured's premiums as agent of the insurer, the insured relying upon
the representationt that he was within the coverage of the group policy.
It is noteworthy that in the Dorman case the employer was considered to
be an agent of the insurer. Since the employer ordinarily administers the
group insurance program, enlisting new participants, submitting proof of loss,
and the like, the estoppel doctrine is seldom applicable in those states which
are committed to the view that the employer is not an agent of the insurer.
Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1939).
11. This reasoning is found in cases where the employer-as-agent theory has been used
in disputes arising out of other phases of the life-cycle of the employer group plan. See
Neider v. Continental Assurance Co., 213 La. 621, 632 (1948) (insurer liable after em-
ployer's failure to remit premiums). Deduction of the contribution by the employer has
been held to constitute payment to the insurer. Somog v. West Virginia & Kentucky Ins.
Agency, 110 W. Va. 205, 157 S.E. 400 (1931) ; Starling v. West Virginia & Kentucky Ins.
Agency, 110 W. Va. 219, 157 S.E. 399 (1931) ; accord, Missouri State L. Ins. Co. v.
Compton, 73 S.W.2d 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); All States Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 226
Ala. 245, 146 So. 393 (1933).
Also the employer has been considered an agent of the insurer for receiving notice of
loss. Coleman v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 127 S.W.2d 764 (Mo. App. 1939) ; Sullivan
v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 110 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. App. 1937); accord, Quinn v.
Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 187 Misc. 629, 67 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
12. Somog v. West Virginia & Kentucky Ins. Agency, 110 W. Va. 205, 157 S.E.
400 (1930).
13. 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1939).
NOTES
This is true since an estoppel can be brought into play against the insurer
only when the insurer or its agents has made some representations, or taken
some action, upon which the insured has reasonably relied to his detriment.14
However, if the insurer himself has so misled the employee, he may still be
estopped even though the employee is considered a third party beneficiary
of the master policy.' 5
A third device whereby the employee has escaped being bound by the
actions of his employer is the definition of the group insurance relation as that
of a tri-party contract between the insurer, employer, and employee.' 6 As
yet, this definition has been applied solely to prevent cancellation of coverage
of an individual employee by the insurer and employer because of termination
of the employment of the employee, without notice of such termination to the
employee.17 This departure from orthodox contract theory has been justified
on the grounds that the employee has given consideration-payment of pre-
miums-and that such notice is necessary to enable the employee to preserve
his right to convert thie group coverage to individual insurance, or to obtain
another insurance policy.'8 Other courts, while still adhering to the third
party beneficiary analysis, have stressed the same factors in recognizing that
14. For discussions of the doctrine of estoppel in employer group cases see Recent
Case Note, 62 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1948) ; Note, Group Insurance-Relation of the Con-
tracting Parties, 6 U. OF NEwARK L. REv. 252 (1941).
15. DeLeon v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 194 Misc. 953, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 415 (N.Y.
Mun. Ct. 1949) (insured estopped to deny that first certificate was additional to coverage
in later certificate when insurer failed to call in old certificate or notify insured of the
change); Sullivan v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 110 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. App. 1937)
(insurer estopped by representations of its local office worker) ; Beets v. Inter Ocean
Casualty Co., 159 Tenn. 564, 20 S.W.2d 1040 (1929) (insurer estopped to deny collection
of premiums when its agent wrongfully neglected to collect from the employer) ; Ameri-
can L. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 78 Ga. App. 98, 50 S.E.2d 231 (1948) (insurer bound by its
agent's representations that employee was an acceptable participant despite the latter's
hernia). Contra: Mariotti v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 122 N.J.L. 360, 5 A.2d 759
(1939) ; cf., Pool v. Protective L. Ins. Co., 26 Ala. App. 161, 155 So. 631 (1934) ; Rogers
v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 265 Mich. 202, 251 N.W. 312 (1933).
If the certificate contradicts the terms of the master policy, the certificate should
prevail by estoppel. See 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 46 (1941).
16. "The policy on its face purports to be a contract between the defendant [insureri
and the company. But when plaintiff [employee] was given the certificate and contri-
buted her portion of the monthly premium, she became a party to the contract. As applied
to plaintiff, the policy then became a tripartite contract. It could not then be modified
without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 190
Okla. 363, 366, 123 P.2d 656, 657 (1942).
17. Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 190 Okla. 363, 123 P.2d 656 (1942) ; Poch v. Equi-
table L. Assur. Soc., 343 Pa. 119, 22 A.2d 590 (1941).
18. See note 19 infra. See also Nick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 Mo. 376, 189 S.W.2d
532 (1945) ; Jones v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 156 Pa. Super. 156, 39 A.2d 721 (1944).
Contra: Metropolitan L Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 203 Ark. 1103, 160 S.W. 852 (1942);
Morales v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc., 115 Ind. App. 565, 60 N.E.2d 747 (1945) ; Szyman-
ski v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 304 Mich. 483, 8 N.W.2d 146 (1943) ; Degnan v.
Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 178 Misc. 312, 34 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1942). On this prob-
lem see Goldstein, Some Legal Aspects of Group Life Insurance, [1947] INs. L.J. 199,
402, 1023.
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group insurance contracts are not like the usual third party beneficiary con-
tract."0 This is said to constitute an important factor in the construction of
the master policy, and these courts have usually managed to construe the policy
as requiring that notice of termination be given to the employee.
20
The result is that by the rule in most states the group insurer will not be
held liable beyond the written terms of the master policy in spite of any mis-
understanding that the employer may create in the insured's mind. It becomes
interesting, therefore, to consider whether a court when presented with a dis-
pute involving a similar misunderstanding in a creditor group life plan would
apply rules laid down in individual insurance cases or would take the judicial
approach found in the majority of the employer group cases. Apparently the
first appellate case to present a court with an opportunity to make such a choice
is Broidy v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Worcester, Massachusetts,2 1
decide by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
19. Emerick v. Conn. Gen'l. Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 60, 179 Atl. 397 (1935) ; John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Pappageorgu, 107 Ind. App. 327, 24 N.E.2d 428 (1940).
20. Other techniques than those mentioned in the text have been used in various
problems involving employer group plans: (1) All ambiguities in the master policy
are resolved against the insurer. See e.g., Eisen v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 230
Mo. App. 312, 91 S.W.2d 81 (1936). (2) The provisions of the certificate were said
to be a part of the contract when many of them were not mentioned in the master policy.
John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1939). (3) The em-
ployer is said to be the agent by statute in Oklahoma. 36 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.
Therefore, the insurer is bound in that state by the employer's representations that the
employee was covered, Voris v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Okla. 1939),
and by the employer's deduction of the employee's contribution, Shanks v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 25 F. Supp. 740 (N. D. Okla. 1938).
A possible substitutionary remedy when the participant has been misled by the
policyholder in the administration of the plan is one against the policyholder. Degnan v.
Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 178 Misc. 312, 34 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (employer
liable for wrongful cancellation of policy). See Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Lembright, 32
Ohio App. 10, 15, 166 N.E. 586, 588 (1928) ; Best v. Equitable L. Ins. Soc., 165 Pa. Super
452, 456, 68 A.2d 400, 402 (1949). See Cox, LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGA-
TIONS UNDER GROUP INSURANCE CONTRACTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN LIFE
CONVENTION, LEGAL SECTION 134, 145-149 (1932); 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 42 (1941). Contra: Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Quilty, 92 F.2d 829 (7th
Cir. 1937) (employer not liable for failure to notify insurer of employee's death) ; Colter
v. American Woolen Co., 270 Mass. 424, 170 N.E. 407 (1930) (employer not liable for
failure to give notice of termination of coverage) ; Kowalski v. Lovell & Covel Co., 266
Mass. 255, 165 N.E. 477 (1929) (saine) ; cf. Venditto v. Spratt's Fatent, 113 N.J.L. 357,
174 Atl. 697 (1934) (employer not required to renew the coverage) ; Minter v. Georgia
Piggly-Wiggly Co., 185 Ga. 116, 194 S.E. 176 (1937) (employer not liable for misinform-
ing employee that he was eligible for coverage) ; accord, Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery
Co., 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94 (1927) (employer's liability does not extend to the
beneficiary).
I A labor union was held liable for breach of contract to procure insurance, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Boiler Makers v. Rodr'iquex, 193 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
21. 186 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1951), reversing 91 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. N.Y. 1950). There
were two preliminary questions raised in the District Court: (1) Whether the case
ought to be tried in a New York state court. The District Court re-aligned the loan
association with the plaintiff. By so shifting the loan association, the court aligned all
NOTES
There the group plan had recently been established between the defendant
insurance company and a New York savings and loan association. Colonel
Broidy, an Air Force officer, who was negotiating the purchase and financing
of a home through the association, was invited by a representative of the in-
surance company to apply for group insurance. The representative, who was
present because he was instructing the association in administration of the
plan, mistakenly informed Broidy that he would be covered in case of death in
a non-commercial aircraft, contrary to the express terms of an "'aviation limi-
tation" clause in the master policy. Broidy filed an application without seeing
the master policy and later received his certificate, which contained the avia-
tion limitation clause but not the customary "agency limitation" or "non-
waiver" clause found in the master policy. Later Broidy was killed in a mili-
tary aircraft crash, and on the insurer's refusal to pay the association the
$10,000 death benefit on the mortgage indebtedness, his widow sued for refor-
mation to strike out the aviation limitation. The District Court, relying on the
rules laid down in the majority of employer group cases, held that Broidy and
his widow were bound by the terms of the master policy. The Court of Ap-
peals reversed in an opinion by Judge Clark, holding that the careless mis-
representations at the time of application by the insurer's representative con-
cerning the extent of coverage were binding.
Whatever novel legal theory may be embodied in the case, it may have
little effect on group insurance law because the fadts were atypical. Instead
of dealing with a representative of the insurer, as Broidy did, the insured
usually deals solely with the policyholder, i.e., the employer or creditor. Hence,
the result can be reconciled with those cases which hold the insurer by estoppel
even though the insured is considered a third party beneficiary: Broidy relied
on the misrepresentations of coverage by the insurer's representative.
However, two striking elements in the opinion mark the case as a de-
parture from the usual judicial analysis of the nature of the group insurance
relationship. First, the remedy of reformation cannot be reconciled with the
third party analysis. Reformation makes an instrument correctly speak the
terms of a contract. If the primary contracting parties were only the insurer
and the association, reformation was an improper remedy since it is available
only when the instrument does not speak the agreement of the contractors.2
Further, there was no evidence that.these two parties did not fully understand
and agree, when the master policy was issued, that there was to be no coverage
New York parties against the insurance company, a Massachusetts corporation. There-
fore, diversity jurisdiction was found to exist. 87 F. Supp. 271. (2) Whether the
colonel's widow was a proper party to bring the action. 10 F.R.D. 195.
22. See Penn~ylvania Oil P. R. Co. v. Willrock Producing Co., 267 N.Y. 427, 434,
196 N.E. 385, 387 (1935) ; Leitner v. Goldwater, 48 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
See POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 112, 870, 1375, 1376 (5th ed., Symons, 194I).
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of a non-commercial 'aviation death. Only if Broidy were a contractor, not
a beneficiary, could reformation properly be granted.
Second, the Court's classification of the dispute as one arising out of
the formation of a contract, instead of one involving a beneficiary's rights
under a pre-existing contract between insurer and policy holder, is significant.
The Court rejected defendant's argument that in no event could coverage be
extended beyond the terms of the master policy because of the "agency limita-
tion" and "non-waiver" clause contained therein to the effect that no agent
could alter its provision. Broidy -was not bound by either the agency limita-
tion or aviation limitation clauses because he had not seen them when making
application. This principle was transferred from the New York ordinary
life, fire and casualty cases 23 to the group case before the court.
The implication of these aspects of the opinion is that the Court con-
sidered IBroidy something more than a third party beneficiary to a contract.
fudge Clark's language strengthens this conclusion, for the insurer was held
liable, it seems, not because its representative had misled Broidy, but because
.. ***it would be too harsh a requirement to hold that the insurance com-
pany's acceptance of the offer which it had directed and canalized in its own
type of application could be limited and made nugatory by the insertion of
details not brought home to the applicant."24 Indeed, the facts of the case
disclose that it was questionable whether the representative of the insurance
company was, by any view, its agent.
It is believed that, ,had the case grown out of careless misrepresentations
by an officer of the association rather than a representative of the insurer, the
Second Circuit would have expressly taken the position that the insured was
a party to a tri-partite contract between insurer, creditor and borrower, as it
did by implication in the Broidy case. Whether the loan association or the in-
surer would bear the loss in that hypothetical case; the insured's rights would
be determined by what he reasonably believed to be the coverage at the forma-
tion of his phase of the contract. Consequently, the mortgage indebtedness
would be reduced by $10,000. In other words, by such a "multi-party" analy-
sis, the insured would not be bound by the master policy's exculpatory pro-
visions of which he had no knowledge nor should reasonably have known at
the time of his application. As noted above, this multi-party analysis has been
used by a few courts in disputes arising out of another phase of the life-cycle
of the employer group plans, that is, termination of coverage.
Clearfy, Judge Clark was little concerned with the niceties of the group
insurance relation. Instead, he was engaged in securing what he felt was con-
23. See note 3 supra..
24. Broidy v. State Mut. L. Assur. Co., 186 F.2d 490, 496 (2d Cir. 1951).
sidered to be proper protection for insurance applicantS. 25  In doing o the
entire body of group insurance case law was disregarded. Such decisions open
the door to the dangers of parol evidence, leaving the insurer to the fate of a
jury's adverse determination of disputed questions of fact. If applied to. the
typical employer group situation, this approach would impose the. same re-
sponsibility for the employer's conduct on the insurer as the- ordinary life
cases impose for the conduct of an insurer's trained agent, over whom the
insurer has direct control. In effect, the youthful group insurance business is
charged with the mature responsibilities that-the law places on the ordinary'
life business. Decisions such as the Broidy case may result in increased pre-
miums for group insurance contracts.
Nevertheless, such an approach is defensible. Responsibility for the in-
evitable errors occurring in the technical transactions of group insurance
should last of all be borne by the insured, who is in no position to disdipline
the system. The insurer places the group policyholder in a position to deal
with the insured, instructs the policyholder how to administer the plan and
expects that the insured will deal exclusively with te policyholder. Since the
economy of group insurance results from the insurer's usd of the policyholder's
records and administrative facilities, the insurer, not the individual insured,
should bear the burden of those mistakes which occur despite the insured's
diligence.
Especially at the time of application, the participant in a group plan needs
protection. He cannot be expected to distinguish between statements that are
in derogation of the master policy and those that are not. The judicial atti-
tudes embodied in the Broidy case places the task of minimizing the oppor-
tunities for dispute on the group insurer. Personnel administering the plans
must be schooled fully in the meaning of the various terms of coverage.; "in-
tended policy limitations"2" must be brought home to the individual partici-
pants at the time of application, just as is now done in other forms of insurance.
25. It is significant that Judge Clark in the opinion of the Broidy case referred to
Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 849 (1947), 60 HARV. L. Rav. 1164, a case also involving a formation-of-contract
problem, but in the context of the effect of a binding receipt on an ordinary life policy.
There, in a concurring opinion, he said the insurer should be liable because of the "inequi-
ties" involved if the insured were to be required to comprehend confusing wordage in the
application providing for a delay in the beginning of coverage. See Schultz, The Special
Nature of the Insurance Contract-A Few Suggestions for Further Study, 15 LAw &
CONTEm'. PROB. 377 at 383-4 (1950).
26. Broidy v. State Mutual L. Assur. Co., 186 F.2d 490, 496 (2d Cir. 1951).
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